This study is an examination of how the present JCS system evolved in history. By reviewing the character of the U. S. colonial heritage and implications of past command structures, the uniquely American rationale for the current system can be more readily understood. The present JCS system itself is analyzed in terms of 9 subjective areas of organizational effectiveness. Each of these areas is discussed and analyzed for optimum performance, efficiency, and historical success. Next this study examines key debates which are now or have recently been raised. Each of these examinations of the JCS command structure is compared against historical trends and previous organizational difficulties - real or perceived. The purpose of this effort was to determine the validity of current criticisms as well as to determine their basis, if any, in historical fact. The conclusions of this study are that the United States has failed to organize a national command structure that would optimize military support of the national interests. The reasons for this conscious decision are many and complex. However, the present JCS system will not adequately address the present and future security needs of the United States. Only the establishment of a centralized Joint General Staff will rectify the problems of high echelon command within the current Department of Defense.

Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)