The US Army conducts counterintelligence and law enforcement operations consistent with the laws and procedural statutes that govern these same operations in the US Air Force, US Navy, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Yet the Army has divided these investigative responsibilities under two separate and distinct organizations, thereby creating an organizational anomaly within the national strategic framework.

Because law enforcement and American strategic counterintelligence activities serve as the principal means by which the nation protects its citizens and ensures national security abroad, it is important to acknowledge this anomaly and understand its ramifications. Effective collaboration between law enforcement and counterintelligence forces has been and will continue to be critical to national interests. This thesis explores the effectiveness of the Army's strategic organization for counterintelligence as overlaid on the theoretical and practical underpinnings of strategic Army intelligence, counterintelligence, and law enforcement. By incorporating this research with interview results, this thesis examines whether or not an intelligence organization is the most effective organizational construct for the prosecution of the Army's strategic, domestic counterintelligence mission and concludes with a broad examination of the strengths and weaknesses of the Army counterintelligence sociotechnical system in a modern context.

Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)