An examination of significant military developments and social and economic conditions during the last three years of the war. This monograph gives a detailed narrative of the Vietnam War’s last two years, after the US departed and ended its military aid to South Vietnam. It closes with the final North Vietnamese offensive in March-April 1975. Lack of effective higher leadership, the author concludes, helped ensure South Vietnamese defeat. .

Contents: Foreword/Introduction; Chapter 1: Before the Cease-Fire; Chapter 2: US Organization for the Cease-Fire; Chapter 3: Landgrab 73; Chapter 4: Consolidating Rebuilding; Chapter 5: The Third Indochina War: First Half-Year; Chapter 6: Cease Fire II in MR1 and 2; Chapter 7: Cease Fire II in MR3 and 4; Chapter 8: The Decline of US Support; Chapter 9: 1974: Year of Decision; Chapter 10: Strategic Raids; Chapter 11: The Highlands to the Hai Van; Chapter 12: The Ring Tightens Around Hue; Chapter 13: The Last Christmas: Phuoc Long; Chapter 14: On the Second Anniversary of the Cease-Fire; Chapter 15: The Central Highlands, March 1975; Chapter 16: The Final Offensive in the North; Chapter 17: The Last Act in the South; Chapter 18: Was Defeat Inevitable?; Maps; Tables.