"Why do military commanders, most of them usually quite capable, fail at crucial moments of their careers? Robert Pois and Philip Langer - one a historian, the other an educational psychologist - study seven cases of military command failures, from Frederick the Great at Kunersdorf to Hitler's invasion of Russia. While Pois and Langer recognized the value of psychological theorizing, they do not believe that one method can cover all the individuals, battles, or campaigns under examination. Instead, they judiciously apply a number of psychohistorical approaches in hope of shedding light on the behaviors of commanders during war. Rather than adhering to theoretical uniformity, the most parsimonious explanations drive their applications of psychological theory. Their goal is to provide plausible explanations for the failures of command discussed within."--Jacket.

Frederick the great at Kunersdorf, August 12, 1759 -- Napoleon in Russia, 1812 -- McClellan's flawed campaign: the wounded ego -- Lee at Gettysburg: the failure of success -- Franklin, Tennessee: the wrong enemy -- Beyond conventional historical explanations: the British military in World War I -- Winston Churchill, Arthur Harris, and British strategic bombing -- Stalingrad: a ghastly collaboration between Hitler and his generals.