This book offers a new explanation of military power, highlighting the role of uncertainty in the creation of combat capabilities.

Cover; Half-title; Title page; Copyright information; Dedication; Table of contents; List of figures; Acknowledgments; 1 Introduction; I What is military power and why should we care?; II Do we need another theory of military power?; i Material and qualitative preponderance; ii Technological sophistication; iii Force employment; iv We need a new, command structure theory of military power; III Methodology; IV Plan of the book; 2 Commanding military power; I What is contingency theory?; i Organizational structure; ii The environment; iii Fit; iv Aggregating fit; v Summary. II A command structure theory of military powerIII Assessing command structure theory (1): identifying fit; i Size; ii Technological sophistication; iii External dynamism; iv Aggregate fit; IV Assessing command structure theory (2): communications and fit; V Assessing command structure theory (3): connecting fit with power; VI The new theory and its expectations; 3 Liaoyang; I Liaoyang: an overview; i Geography; ii Dispositions and intentions; iii The battle; II Theoretical assessment; i Material preponderance; ii Soldier quality and motivation; iii Weapons technology; iv Force employment. V Command structureIII Was it all Kuropatkin's fault?; IV Conclusion; 4 The Huai-Hai Campaign; I Huai-Hai: an overview; i Geography; ii Dispositions and intentions; iii The battle; II Theoretical assessment; i Material preponderance; ii Soldier quality and motivation; iii Weapons technology; iv Force employment; v Command structure; III Conclusion; 5 The 5th Phase Offensive; I The 5th Phase Offensive: an overview; i Geography; ii Dispositions and intentions; iii The battle; II Theoretical assessment; i Material preponderance; ii Soldier quality and motivation; iii Weapons technology. Iv Force employmentv Command structure; III Is it all about logistics?; IV Conclusion; 6 The 3rd Phase Offensive; I The 3rd Phase Offensive: an overview; i Geography; ii Dispositions and intentions; iii The battle; II Theoretical assessment; i Material preponderance; ii Soldier quality and motivation; iii Weapons technology; iv Force employment; v Command structure; III Why was the UNC command structure so bad?; IV Conclusion; 7 Conclusion; I Commanding military power; II The utility of command structure theory; i Generalizability; ii Causal significance; iii Anticipating fit. III Implications for scholarshipi Military power; ii Military power in international relations; iii Command structure in non-martial organizations; IV Implications for policy; V Commanding power in international relations; References; Index.