This book provides a brief and manageable collection of the most important documents on U.S. policymaking in the Vietnam War between 1950 and 1968. Edited by the foremost Vietnam historian, this supplementary text can be used in conjunction with any history of the Vietnam war--Herring's own America's Longest War, for example.

1. Origins of Involvement, 1946-1960. Ho Chi Minh's 1946 Appeal for Help. NSC 1952 Policy Study on Southeast Asia. French Seek U.S. Air Intervention at Dienbienphu. U.S. Rejects French Plea. French Response. Instructions to U.S. Delegation to Geneva Conference. Joint Chiefs of Staff 1954 War Plans for Indochina. Geneva Accords, July 1954. U.S. Response to Geneva Accords. Edward Lansdale Report on CIA Operations in Vietnam, 1954-1955. Ambassador Durbrow's Concern About Diem Government, 1960 -- 2. John F. Kennedy and the Escalation of the War, 1961-1963. Kennedy Task Force May 1961 "Program of Action" NSAM 52 May 1961 Program. LBJ May 1961 Report on Asian Trip. Maxwell Taylor Proposes U.S. Combat Troops for Vietnam. McNamara Response to Taylor Proposals. State Department Pessimism on Vietnam. Intelligence Assessment of 1963 Buddhist Protest. Washington Moves Toward Coup. Ambassador Lodge Encourages Coup Planning. CIA Station Chief Assesses Coup Prospects. Lodge Scenario for Removal of Diem. Washington Response to Lodge Proposals. Unravelling of August Coup Plan. Generals Renew Coup Plotting. Washington Response to Minh Overture. Lodge Urges Support for Coup. Washington's Concern About Coup. Lodge Urges Proceeding with Plan. Bundy Outlines Contingency Plans. Lodge Phone Conversation with Diem -- 3. Graduated Response, 1963-1965. McNamara's March 1964 Assessment of Situation in Vietnam. NSAM 288 Plans for Retaliation. U.S. Warnings to North Vietnam. September 1964 Proposals for Escalation. McNaughton Proposals, November 1964. Ambassador Taylor's Meeting with South Vietnamese Generals -- 4. America Goes to War, 1965. Bundy Urges "Sustained Reprisal" Washington Approves Rolling Thunder. McNaughton's March 1965 Proposals. CIA Assessment of Air War. NSAM 328 Enlarges Ground Forces and Changes Mission. George Ball Opposes Escalation. McNamara Urges Major Expansion of Ground Forces -- 5. Stalemate, 1965-1966. McNamara's November 1965 Assessment of the War. McNamara's Early Doubts. McNaughton Hints at Compromise. Proposal for an Anti-Infiltration Barrier. Johnson Presses for "Coonskins on the Wall" Walt Rostow on Pol Bombing. JCS Order Pol Attacks. McNamara Seeks to Limit Ground Forces. Westmoreland Asks for Additional Troops. IDA Assessment of the Bombing -- 6. The 1967 Policy Debate. McNamara Opposes Escalation. JCS Oppose Cutback in Bombing. McNamara November 1966 DPM. Westmoreland Requests Additional Troops. JCS Support Westmoreland Request. Johnson, Wheeler, and Westmoreland Discuss Force Needs. McGeorge Bundy Opposes Escalation. Enthoven Opposes Increase in Ground Forces. Rostow Analysis of Air War. McNamara Turns Dove. William Bundy Response to McNamara -- 7. The Tet Offensive and the End of Escalation. CINPAC Late 1967 Report on War. Wheeler's Post-Tet Report to President. LBJ's March 31, 1968 Decisions -- The Pentagon Papers: A Bibliographical Essay.