Pt. 1: This volume describes those JCS activities related to developments in Vietnam during the period 1960-1963, when the United States expanded its initial military commitment to Southeast Asia. In 1960, the United States increased its military advisory strength in South Vietnam in response to increased Communist infiltration and to more sustained guerrilla attacks in the south and its contingency planning effort to deploy regular US forces to both Laos and South Vietnam to counter any threat by Communist Army units from the north or from China. President Kennedy's called for a new emphasis upon guerrilla warfare at first received only lukewarm support from the Joint Chiefs of Staff. After the failed Bay of Pigs episode very early in the Kennedy administration, the President lost faith in the advice of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and appointed General Maxwell Taylor to serve as his intermediary with the Joint Chiefs, until he assumed the Chairman responsibilities in October 1962. The Kennedy administration's policy was marked by clashes between factions in the Defense Department, including the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the State Department, and the White House. By 1963, these differences involved the support the US should provide for the Republic of Vietnam under its President, Ngo Dinh Diem. The history ends with the killing of Diem by a coup followed by the coincidental murder of President Kennedy a short time later.

"David Armstrong edited the revised version of part 3"--Foreword.

pt. 1. -- Vietnam and the Eisenhower administration : the view from Washington and Vietnam -- The Kennedy administration and crisis management : Vietnam and Lao, January-March 1961 -- Continuing crisis : Laos and Vietnam, March-May 1961 -- A new emphasis on Vietnam -- Continuing reassessment and the Taylor mission -- From MAAG to MACV -- A new beginning -- The continuing war in Vietnam and the Laotian interlude -- The ongoing war -- Uncertain progress, October 1962-March 1963 -- From Laotian crisis to Buddhist revolt -- From crisis to crisis, June-August 1963 -- The aftermath -- Conclusion. pt. 2. -- Prologue : at the end of 1963 -- President Johnson's first months -- Johnson's course confirmed, NSAM 288 -- Command reorganization in South Vietnam -- An escalation scenario takes shape -- New faces in Saigon and more troops -- Going north : Tonkin Gulf and its effects -- US action awaits stability in Saigon -- The Bien Hoa attack and the US reaction -- A new Presidential decision -- Implementing the Presidential decisions -- A new stage of US commitment -- The quantum jump : ROLLING THUNDER -- Limited deployment of US forces -- The logistics of escalation -- Deployment planning, March-June 1965 -- Into the battle, June 1965-February 1966 -- Command arrangements and allies -- Military operations, July-December 1965 -- ROLLING THUNDER continues -- The search for peace begins -- ROLLING THUNDER resumes and expands -- Deployments and forces, 1966 -- The war in South Vietnam, 1966 -- The air, the sea, and the borders -- Logistics issues, 1966 -- ROLLING THUNDER, July 1966-January 1967 -- Efforts toward negotiation -- Conclusion : five silent men?. pt. 3. -- The situation, January 1967 -- Action on the diplomatic front -- Rolling Thunder gains momentum, February-June, 1967 -- Launching the general offensive : operations in South Vietnam, January-May, 1967 -- The debate over escalation -- Rolling Thunder at it's zenith : operations against North Vietnam, July 1967-January 1968 -- Military operations in South Vietnam, June 1967-January 1968 -- Pacification and nation building, 1967 -- Domestic dissent and policy debate -- The Tet offensive -- A new departure in policy -- De-escalation and the quest for talks -- Strengthening the RVNAF -- After Tet : the May and August offensives -- The Paris Talks through the bombing halt -- Pressing the attack in the south -- Conclusion.