Two years before the atomic attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki helped bring a quick end to hostilities in the summer of 1945, U.S. planners began work on Operation Downfall, codename for the Allied invasions of Kyushu and Honshu, in the Japanese home islands. While other books have examined Operation Downfall, D. M. Giangreco offers the most complete and exhaustively researched consideration of the plans and their implications. He explores related issues of the first operational use of the atomic bomb and the Soviet Union's entry into the war, including the controversy surrounding estimates of potential U.S. casualties.

Previous edition: 2009.

Foreword to the first edition: "Three colonels" /by Stanley Weintraub -- The maximum "bloodletting and delay" -- Spinning the casualties -- The First Army and Kwantung redeployments -- The Pacific buildup and Berlin decision -- "Not the recipe for victory" -- The decision -- Japanese defense plans -- "Victory might be salvaged" -- The "manpower box" -- Mistakes and misperceptions -- "To break Japan's spine" -- What is defeat? -- The amphibious operation -- On the ground -- Unexamined factors -- A "target-rich environment: -- The Hokkaido myth -- Half a million Purple Hearts -- "Punishment from heaven" -- Epilogue: Extract from a letter written by James Michener, October 20, 1995 -- Appendix A. G-2 estimates of enemy situation on Kyushu, U.S. Sixth Army, August 1, 1945 -- Appendix B. G-2 analysis of Japanese plans for the defense of Kyushu, U.S. Sixth Army, December 31, 1945 -- Appendix C. Proclamation defining terms for Japanese surrender issued at Potsdam, July 26, 1945 (Potsdam Declaration) -- Appendix D. Operation Blacklist, the occupation of Japan.