"This work points primarily to the British Army's institutional bias against wireless communication as the technology's downfall, reinforced by the crude, unreliable wireless sets with which the army began the war. It also demonstrates how improved wireless communications between infantry, command, artillery and air observation could have improved the flexibility, accuracy and effectiveness of British strategy"--Provided by publisher.

Preface -- Introduction -- 1. Military wireless before the war -- 2. Operational signals : pre-war and early mobile warfare -- 3. Operational signals : static warfare in 1915 -- 4. 1915 : the RFC invents wireless telephony -- 5. Operational signals on the Somme -- 6. A counterfactual : the Somme with wireless telephony -- 7. Operational signals in 1917 -- 8. A counterfactual : Passchendaele and Cambrai with wireless telephony -- 9. Operations signals in 1918 -- 10. A counterfactual : the German Spring Offensive and Hundred Days with wireless telephony -- 11. Command, control and communications -- 12. Intercept, encryption and jamming -- 13. An assessment of wireless as it was actually employed -- Conclusion -- Appendix A: Wireless technology -- Appendix B: Signal service units, 1914 -- Appendix C: Signals service units later in the war -- Chapter notes.