From April to June 1945, U.S. and Imperial Japanese Army (lJA) forces fought fiercely for control of the island of Okinawa. The Japanese Imperial General Headquarters (IGHO) had determined after U.S. strikes on Truk in February 1944 that sooner or later the Americans would seize Okinawa as a forward base for the invasion of Japan. The IJA 32d Army was established on Okinawa in March 1944 to forestall this eventuality and immediately faced the challenge of how to deal not only with superior numbers of U.S. troops but also with overwhelming American firepower by air, land, and sea. The 32d Army's innovative staff had one year in which to invent and implement a new form of underground warfare that would be proof against the Americans' abundant bombs and tanks. Their methods were devised in the field in defiance both of the IJA's traditional light infantry doctrine and of IGHO's preoccupation with air power.

Chapter 1.Anticipation of the battle, March 1944 to March 1945 -- Early preparations: The air strategy -- IJA main units: heavy and light divisions -- Other units -- Reorganization -- The 32d Army's leadership: heroism versus realism -- The locus of authority in the 32d Army staff -- Ground or air -- Chapter 2. Defensive engagement, April 1945 -- The American landings -- Planning the Japanese 12 April offensive -- The American advance -- The Japanese 12 April offensive -- Night problems -- Moving the Army north -- Chapter 3. Lethality in motion: tactics -- Cave warfare -- The command cave -- Line and artillery caves -- Cave warfare: some comparisons -- Okinawa terrain -- Cave warfare tactics -- Tanks versus caves -- Japanese antitank tactics -- American anticave tactics -- Japanese artillery -- Chapter 4. Attack and retreat, May 1945 -- The 29 April meeting -- Honorable death attack and ritual suicide -- Preparing the 4 May offensive -- Results of the 4 May offensive -- The 29 May withdrawal -- Chapter 5. The last days, June 1945 -- Japanese casualties -- American casualties -- Conclusion.