In Coercion, Survival and War Phil Haun chronicles 30 asymmetric interstate crises involving the US from 1918 to 2003. The U.S. chose coercive strategies in 23 of these cases, but coercion failed half of the time: most often because the more powerful U.S. made demands that threatened the very survival of the weak state, causing it to resist as long as it had the means to do so. It is an unfortunate paradox Haun notes that, where the U.S. may prefer brute force to coercion, these power asymmetries may well lead it to first attempt coercive strategies that are expected to fail in order to justify the war it desires. He concludes that, when coercion is preferred to brute force there are clear limits as to what can be demanded.

Tables, Figures, and Maps --Acknowledgments -- Chapter 1. Introduction -- Chapter 2. A Theory of Asymmetric Interstate Coercion -- Chapter 3. Survival and Coercion Failure -- Chapter 4. The United States Versus Iraq -- Chapter 5. The United States Versus Serbia -- Chapter 6. The United States Versus Libya -- Chapter 7. Conclusion -- Appendix A. Coding U.S. Cases of Asymmetric Coercion -- Appendix B. Asymmetric Coercion Model -- Notes -- Index.

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