"This paper scrutinizes the senior aeronautical leaders in the early inter-war period. The author's thesis is that the Navy embraced the new technology of aviation, and the entire Navy changed as a result, while the Army rejected aviation, relegating it to a separate special category that inevitably led to independence. The author's contention is that Rear Admiral William Moffett's superior leadership and acute understanding of his organization brought about the metamorphosis of the Navy into a modern combat force, while the Army aeronautical leaders misunderstanding of their organization was responsible for the technology being rejected. The author also proposes that Brigadier General William Mitchell, far from the often proclaimed spiritual father of the modern Air Force, was the inept leader primarily responsible for the United States NOT forming an independent air force during the interwar period. This study addresses two questions: Why was an independent air force that included both Army and Navy aviation not established by the United States during this period; and did the aeronautical leaders of 1918-1926 succeed or fail in their goal to develop a potent air arm for the United States? Why study this period and these leaders? As a leader's challenge in guiding an organization in a changing world is not new, the modern leader is wise to examine the dynamics of leadership through the study of history. The challenge to leaders in times of great change was just as vivid in 1918 following World War I, as the challenge leaders face today at the end of the cold war. Rapidly advancing technology, especially space and information war technology, are raising questions as to the traditional services role in national defense. This study examines how our predecessors dealt with similar issues and explores the organizational dynamics and leaders' role organizations."--DTIC abstract.

"April 1997." "A research report submitted to the faculty in partial fulfillment of the curriculum requirements."