Why have efforts to dismantle the North Korean nuclear program failed so far? What can be done in order to achieve a peaceful and long-lasting resolution to this conundrum? To answer these questions, this monograph scrutinizes and refutes two prevailing academic-cum-policy approaches to the North Korean nuclear situation: the use of coercive tools within a general framework of containment, and bypassing the regime in Pyongyang and engaging the Korean people with the hope that they will gain enough power to transform North Korea into a democratic nuclear-free country. The author argues that neither of these approaches can provide any meaningful solution to the North Korean nuclear dilemma. Instead, he suggests that engaging the regime in Pyongyang and forgoing endeavors to forcefully push democracy in North Korea are inseparable prerequisites to a peaceful and lasting solution to this problem.

"December 2010."

Summary -- Introduction -- Nuclear weapons, motivation, and sense of vulnerability -- A historical review of North Korea's perceived vulnerability and its nuclear program -- The height of the Cold War (1950-68) -- Détente and rapprochement (1969-89) -- The collapse of the Communist bloc and its aftermath : from the late 1980s to the Framework Agreement -- Following the 1994 Framework Agreement -- Conclusion.