pt. 1. War and peace. The contexts of war are all important -- War is about peace, and peace can be about war -- It is more difficult to make peace than it is to make war -- War works!-but always has unintended and unanticipated consequences -- Peace and order are not self-enforcing, they have to be organized and kept by somebody -- Not only polities, but societies and their cultures make war and peace -- Reason reigns over war, but passion and chance threaten to rule -- There is more to war than warfare -- Policy is king, but often is ignorant of the nature and character of war -- War is always a gamble -- pt. 2. Strategy. Knowledge of strategy is vital: the flame of strategic understanding has to be kept lit -- Strategy is more difficult than policy or tactics -- Bad strategy kills, but so also do bad policy and tactics -- If Thucydides, Sun-Tzu, and Clausewitz did not say it, it probably is not worth saying -- The strategic "concept du jour" will be tomorrow's stale left-over, until it is rediscovered, recycled, and revealed as a new truth -- The enemy too has a vote -- Time is the least forgiving dimension of strategy -- Friction is unavoidable, but need not be fatal -- All strategy is geostrategy: geography is fundamental -- Strategy is not wholly military -- The impossible is impossible; it is a condition, not a problem for which a solution has yet to be found -- pt. 3. Military power and warfare. People matter most -- Military power is trumps in politics -- Military excellence can only be verified by performance in war -- Military excellence cannot guarantee strategic success -- Victory in battle does not ensure strategic or political success, but defeat all but guarantees failure -- There is more to war than firepower: the enemy is not just a target set -- Logistics is the arbiter of strategic opportunity -- pt. 4. Security and insecurity. Bad times return -- There are always thugs, villains, rogues, and fools out there, as well some in here, who mean us harm -- Super-threats do appear -- Prudence is the supreme virtue in statecraft and strategy -- Strategic history punishes good intentions -- Defense costs are certain, but security benefits are uncertain and arguable -- Arms can be controlled, but not by arms control -- pt. 5. History and the future. Nothing of real importance changes: modern history is not modern -- History can be misused to "prove" anything, but it is all that we have as a guide to the future -- The future is not foreseeable: nothing dates so rapidly as today's tomorrow -- Surprise is unavoidable, but its effect is not -- Tragedy happens.