The threat to US national security from mobile ballistic missiles is at least as great today as at any time in history to include the heights of the Cold War. Proliferation of missile technology and associated weapons of mass destruction already jeopardize America's ability to project power to any corner of the globe. The 1991 Gulf War opened our eyes to the significant potential of this threat. Our decision makers realized that had just one of the missiles launched against Israel been armed with a weapon of mass destruction, the outcome of that conflict may have been far different. In response, the US defense establishment spent billions of dollars to research and field greatly improved precision munitions; more elaborate surveillance systems; and perhaps most importantly, more persistent reconnaissance platforms. But has this reaction in the years since the Gulf War been adequate? Has the US prepared for proper integration of these individual examples of advanced technology? Indeed, terms such as "precision engagement" and "time-sensitive targeting" have come into vogue, but have we covered all of the necessary bases to turn these drawing board concepts into a reality on the battlefield? Finally, the strategist must ask who, if anyone, will serve as the advocate for the counterforce mission against ground-mobile ballistic missiles. Does a specific community need to be created for this task? While investigating these topics, my research centered on an interview with one of the former Soviet Union's top missile engineers, the Vice Commander of Air Combat Command, discussions with the USAF Air Armament Center's Chief of Advanced Concepts, and on recently declassified CIA documents regarding the US reconnaissance program and National Intelligence Estimates. Also important to this work are Russian language sources documenting the Soviet need to develop mobile missiles. Although many other sources within the media and academia were tapped for information, these were the most prominent. As a result, this study highlights many of the great technological leaps America has made toward being able to attack mobile missiles, but it also underscores the need for improved coordination. Perhaps most importantly, the necessity for a more responsive post-Cold War strategic mind-set and doctrine for attacking these mobile menaces was underscored. As such, this study offers the following six recommendations: 1. Develop those capabilities that allow persistent surveillance and reconnaissance coupled with the ability to discriminate between potential targets before conducting precision strike operations. 2. Augment the concept of deterrence with that of pre-emption in joint military planning and doctrine. 3. Develop a focused, counterforce-minded, joint community responsible for hunting and destroying ground-mobile ballistic missile launchers. It is vital that this team include elements of the national intelligence community to ensure information stovepipes are broken down. 4. Create a formal joint school and specific identity for those involved in the defense against mobile missiles. 5. Implement the RAND mobile ballistic missile counterforce concept. 6. Conduct regular formal training, exercises, and evaluations for the units specifically responsible for the battle against ground-mobile ballistic missiles.

"May 2006." "A thesis presented to the faculty of the School of Advanced Air and Space Studies for completion of graduation requirements." -- T.p.

Introduction -- The evolution and spread of mobile ballistic missiles -- The American Cold War response -- Responding to mobile ballistic missiles in the post-Cold War environment -- Conclusions and recommendations -- Areas for further study.