"Literature on command and control (the direction and coordination of military forces) traditionally deals with technology and procedures. The underlying domestic conditions, including cultural, personal and political relations, are rarely the focus for command and control theory. This book analyses two instances where several tacit, but still fundamental, assumptions were at loggerheads. The study is based on theoretical 'nuts and bolts', provided in the opening chapters." "In March 1918, the 'luxury' of having several armies present in the field, without any central military authority, had become too expensive, with the Germans threatening to destroy the Allied forces piecemeal. In this first case study, the author shows how internal British disagreements over strategy initially weakened the British Expeditionary Force, and then how Field Marshal Haig made matters worse by relentlessly fighting for his prerogatives as their supreme commander. The book also shows how, after the war, Haig forged his own account of the incident, to disguise his intolerable 'surrender' to a French general, and how this deception has coloured historians' accounts of the episode, until today." "The second case study analyses how Norway tumbled into war in 1940. The Norwegian government had a tacit, incoherent and poorly coordinated plan for how they should once again keep Norway out of war. As a consequence, a de facto decision to resist German aggression was in fact taken by a rather insignificant colonel. The author demonstrates how the underlying conditions of command and control, and not the actual directives from the government, which have traditionally been the historians' focus, determined Norway's destiny."--BOOK JACKET.

Foreword /Hew Strachan -- 1. Introduction -- 2. Command and Control -- 3. Crisis -- 4. Case 1: The Tactical Field Marshal -- 5. Case 2: The Strategic Colonel -- 6. Conclusion.