“This study is about part of American's experience in Viet-Nam. It is about the military activity and the decisions to engage in it that took place between the years 1961 and 1968. The focus of analysis is upon how the decisions were made and how they were executed. More specifically, United States military policy in Viet-Nam is to be explained in terms of the upper level bureaucratic interactions and lower level organizational operations of the national security bureaucracy. The argument is that the content of policy was to a significant degree a function of the processes by which policy was made and executed. The purpose in making the argument is to show how policy and process were linked at critical points in the Viet-Nam case, so that not only will the events be better understood, but also so that we will be better able to influence future policy.” -- introduction.

Introduction --The bureaucratic perspective -- The early decisions: 1960-1963 -- The 1965 consensus and the decision to bomb North Viet-Nam -- Explaining the bombing: 1965-1967 -- Conclusion: policy content from policy process.