Though the US is physically located in the Western Hemisphere, for most of its history, policy toward the South American countries that share this region has taken a distant second to Euro-centric issues. One of the few areas of concern that has consistently energized contemporary debate about relations with these Southern neighbors is the "war on drugs." In Colombia, the narcotics trafficking problem has become increasingly complex as drug trade has merged with a fifty-year-old insurgency that appears to be gaining strength. Colombia's position in the national discourse has been raised recently with the request by the government of Colombia for $1.3 billion in financial and materiel aid to support its Plan Colombia, a $7.5 billion counter-narcotic, counter-insurgency offensive. Recent US policy toward Colombia has been dominated by concerns about narco-trafficking. Although the government of Colombia is dealing with an extremely complex security threat, the US government has chosen to restrict its assistance to only those activities that are both directly contributing to the counter-narcotic effort and distinct from any counter-insurgent efforts. There are oft-stated fears of becoming mired in a Vietnam-style conflict. Unfortunately, the difficulty of distinguishing between counter-narcotic and counter-insurgent operations cannot be overestimated in the present Colombian environment. Many pundits and even some government officials attempt to simplify the equation by claiming the dominant insurgent group-Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia--FARC) is no longer a group of revolutionaries driven by ideology and a desire to supplant the existing government, but have instead devolved into a criminal drug organization with an insurgent propagandistic façade. If this conclusion were accurate, it could potentially simplify implementation of US policy and reduce the strings attached to aid for the Colombian government. If, however, this conclusion is flawed (or at least a dangerous oversimplification) the consequences for future US involvement could be grave. In the interest of obeying Sun Tzu's admonition to "know your enemy," it seems prudent to answer the question, "Is the FARC still an insurgency?" The analysis of this specific inquiry is structured in five sections. The first section describes the importance of the research question. For the issue to be relevant, it must first be established that the US has an interest in what happens to Colombia. Is Colombia a part of the US national security sphere? Once the significance of Colombia has been proven, the next step is to explain why the nature of the FARC has a bearing on US policy in the region. Section two lays the necessary foundation, which includes the turbulent political history of Colombia that gave rise to insurgent movements, as well as contemporary circumstances that shape the current situation. In light of the changing nature of the insurgent groups and the US policy distinctions between counter-narcotic and counter-insurgent activities, section three explores the nature of insurgency. What are the necessary and sufficient criteria for classifying a group as insurgent, vice criminal or terrorist? With a clearer understanding of exactly what is required for an insurgency, the FARC is examined to answer the basic research question. How do its actions and ideology match up with relevant criteria? Implications for the debate on US involvement in Colombia are presented in section five. Colombia is facing an extremely complex problem and related US policy concerns are no simpler. While this paper addresses a very important question, it is also limited in scope. It does not attempt to rule on the merit of the ideologies involved. It makes no attempt to fix blame for the current situation. It does not address the manifold problems of human rights and the Colombian military's involvement with right-wing paramilitaries. It does not propose a solution to the drug problem or even presume to suggest appropriate US policy. Its purpose is strictly to inform the debate by examining the character one of the "enemies" involved in the struggle. In the final accounting, the FARC is conducting revolutionary insurgent warfare. Policy makers would do well to remember this when formulating US posture and actions toward the government of Colombia.

ADA 391934 Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)