This monograph examines and explores the concept of Commander's Critical Information Requirements (CCIR). The analysis focuses on ways a commander can manage information overload to effectively deal with uncertainty and to ultimately ensure timely decisions are made. It examines the relationship between command and control, decision making, and information management. Part I discusses how current doctrine defines CCIR and evaluates the adequacy of this doctrine for today's commander. This examination also presents several studies that focused on the development and identification of CCIR. Part I also looks at limitations that affect a commander's decision making abilities. Part II examines how commanders in the field define, develop, and use CCIR. Four commanders were interviewed; Brigadier General Randolph House, Brigadier General John Sylvester, Lieutenant Colonel Terry Tucker, and Lieutenant Colonel Pat Ritter. Each of these officers commanded forces in combat during Operation Desert Storm. The interviews were concerned with each individual's general definition of CCIR, the development of his critical information requirements for specific tactical events, and the impact of the availability of the applicable CCIR. Finally, the conclusion examines and analyzes the findings in Parts I and II. As a result of this analysis, recommendations are made to enhance the management of information to support effective decision making on the battlefield.

ADA 289232 Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)