This monograph discusses the difference between both ground and air commanders who are subordinate to an overall theater commander. Although joint doctrine has evolved and improved, there are still differences between the two kinds of commanders due to the different theater views they hold. The ground commander is generally concerned with his locality and area of interest, while the air commander is concerned with a theater-wide prosecution of the conflict. These two views tend to be at odds with each other, and conflict between the two kinds of commanders tends to develop. To examine this phenomena, the monograph uses two case studies that occurred nearly fifty years apart. The first case study is the North African campaign that occurred in 1942 and 1943. The second case study is the Gulf War that occurred in 1990 and 1991. Using both primary and secondary sources, the monograph examines the doctrine that was available prior to the respective conflicts, how the theater command architecture evolved in each case, and how the differences between the two commanders developed during the respective conflicts. After examining these two case studies individually, the monograph compares the two conflicts. First of all, the doctrine was not much help in either case. It was developed in peacetime by consensus, and therefore allowed each service to 'see' the potential use of military force the way it wanted to. It didn't stand up to the rigors of combat and solutions had to be hastily implemented. Secondly, in both cases, the implementation of a strong, unambiguous theater command architecture helped the situation. It did not, however, satisfy the more local requirements of the ground commanders. The air commander had to balance the theater-wide requirements of the CINC against the ground commanders' more localized requirements. With this information in mind, the monograph develops conclusions about future situations air and ground commanders will be involved in. First of all, any scarce weapon with theater-wide flexibility will probably be centralized under the CINC's' control. Next, though each situation will be different, the two perspectives will probably be present. Therefore, both types of commanders need to be aware that there is another viewpoint, and work to iron out the differences based on the specific situation. This will require trust in an environment that lends itself to distrust. Third, air commanders need to be aware that centralizing theater assists (aircraft) won't automatically reduce the concerns of the ground commanders. In fact, it makes ground commanders more concerned that aircraft won't be available when they need them. Finally, the ground commanders need to be aware that the air commander is balancing the requirements of local air support to various ground commanders with the CINC's theater-wide view of aircraft employment.

ADA 309693 Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)