Since the end of the Cold War in 1989, the United States has embarked upon many military operations that were not bound by the traditional framework of revolution or insurgency. States formerly held together by the political logic and financial support of bipolar international relations were under increasing assault from within their borders. This complicated environment has required the U.S. Army to conceptualize the strategic environment in a comprehensive way to inform doctrine and provide commanders direction in applying military forces in post-Cold War crises. This monograph defines the model of intra-state conflict as described by historian and social scientist Crane Brinton. His book, The Anatomy of Revolution, provides a useful framework to understand the nature of intra-state conflict. Brinton analyzed the English, American, French, and Russian revolutions with his "conceptual scheme" to identify common traits among these four examples that would offer the reader a deeper understanding of the process of revolution. After describing Brinton's work, this monograph introduces the concept of the failed state, which affords Brinton's model fundamental differences in the initial stages of intra-state conflict. The failed state concept may reflect a revolution that has been too successful, thus destroying vital elements of the state system that makes the country vulnerable to future internal threats. This outcome spawns new actors that impact on the viability of the state, the well-being of the people, and on the strategy and tactics of an intervening military force. The monograph then explores two contemporary case studies of intra-state conflict. The Somalia intervention of 1992-1994 demonstrates the path of a country that leads to virtual failure. The state could not withstand the constant struggle for power between the clans, and collapsed under its own weight. The Indonesia/East Timor crisis of 1999 offers an example of the trajectory of a country suffering from the slow decay of a false revolution. The hollow promises of national unity by corrupt autocrats and the extraordinary presence of the military in all facets of society prevented the full growth of institutions that would allow for peaceful debate and transfer of power. After employing Brinton's model and the failed state concept to examine the case studies, this monograph studies U.S. Army doctrine to identify the existing shortcomings in describing the state of the environment in stability and support operations (SASO), the emerging description of military operations other than war (MOOTW). The monograph demonstrates the necessity to understanding the antecedents of an intra-state conflict in order to accurately identify the state of the environment. This description of intra-state conflict offers the military planner the tools to identify a crisis, forecast possible outcomes, and contemplate appropriate strategies and tactics to resolve the conflict.

ADA 381778 Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)