In this thoroughly researched and lucidly written volume, Lt. Col. John F. Shiner describes the Air Corps' effort to prepare the nation for war; to gain money, aircraft, and, even more important, independence; and to achieve a capability to wage aerial war. The focus of the work is Maj. Gen. Benjamin Foulois and his tenure as Chief of the Air Corps between 1931 and 1935. But the implications of Shiner's findings go beyond either the personalities or the issues. They encompass the whole character of developing United States military policy and its ascendancy to leadership in aviation during World War II. At the beginning of Foulois' stewardship, the Air Corps lacked both a "specific mission" and a "clearly defined doctrine." It possessed neither the aircraft not the organization for an independent role in conflict. War Department leaders were convinced that future war would be decided in ground fighting and that the most logical and effective mission for air power was in support of the land forces. On its part, the Navy was determined to develop its own air arm and to prevent army aviation from gaining any mission that overlapped into the naval environment. From these battles merged the foundations of the large air fleets t

Includes index.

Foreword -- Preface -- Foulois and the Air Arm, 1908-1931 -- Doctrine, mission, and employment concepts, 1931-1933 -- Organization toward a GHQ Air Force 1932-1933 -- Funds, aircraft, and personnel, 1931-1933 -- The air mail fiasco -- Procurement troubles, 1933-1935 -- The Chief in trouble, 1934-1935 -- Funds, aircraft, personnel and bases, 1934-1935 -- An age of transition -- Notes -- Glossary -- Bibliographic note -- Index.