Doctrinally, artillery in the defense is allocated to maneuver units to lend the weight of its fires to the direct fire battle. In the direct support mission, its ability to mass fires is limited by habitual associations that allocate at least one artillery battalion to each committed maneuver brigade. The range of its effectiveness is constrained to the ability of the brigade to acquire and develop targets, normally 3-5 kilometers. A better solution might be upgrade battalion mortar platoons with weapons capable of firing armor-defeating improved conventional munitions and assign them the mission of providing suppressive fires for the brigade; thereby making available the traditionally direct support battalions to fire under division control. This would capitalize upon the superior targeting and intelligence capabilities at division to defeat an enemy who echelons his forces in order to destroy a defender with mass and momentum at a time and place of the attacker's choosing. This monograph will examine the feasibility of such a proposal. An examination of Soviet doctrine and vulnerabilities concludes specific opportunities for disruption of offensive momentum and destruction of attacking forces are presented. U.S. intelligence acquisition and target development capabilities at division level, however, greatly exceed those available to the maneuver brigade commanders. Doctrine allocates the majority of divisional indirect fire assets to the brigade close-in battle. The result is that the level of command in the division with the greatest allocation of indirect fire assets is not able to locate and engage targets early enough to prevent their mass and momentum from being felt at the FLOT. Ballistic characteristics of indirect fire systems, moreover, limit their ability to provide a target effect greater than suppression once the target becomes dispersed. The study concludes that upgrading heavy mortar platoons organic to maneuver battalions will collectively provide the brigade commander with the indirect fire suppression capability essential for the success of the close-in battle. Previously committed direct support artillery battalions will then be available to engage attacking enemy formations during their most critical and vulnerable times. The increased level of destruction inflicted upon the enemy before he reaches friendly positions should compensate for the brigade's loss of its direct support battalion, and provide the division commander with a cost effective, responsive, and extremely potent deep battle capability.

ADA 190842 Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)