The Navy's aircraft carrier battle groups have historically been the first to arrive in troubled areas around the world, and will strive to do so in the future. As a result of this commitment, Navy CAS has played a role in the close fight for Army and Marine Corps ground units in every major conflict since World War II. In Korea, Navy CAS proved extremely valuable, both in forced entry operations, such as Inchon, and in evacuation operations, such as the retreat from the Yalu. Likewise, in Vietnam, Navy CAS proved critical in battles such as Khe Sanh. Despite the great success of Air Force assets in Desert Storm, history and geography reveal that the availability of air fields in the vicinity of the front may not always follow the user friendly environment of Saudi Arabia. Often, the air field environment of Korea or Vietnam may more accurately template the war of the future, especially in the entry and exit phases of an operation. For this reason, it is essential that the combat power of Navy CAS not be forgotten. Yet today, parochial arguments persist which claim that one service can do the job better than all the others. Contrary to the notion that one service is in fact 'best,' this monograph addresses the synergistic question relating to CAS: Are there operational benefits to be obtained through Army and Navy CAS cooperation? In researching this question, an examination of CAS from the current U.S. perspective on air power theory in general will set the stage for further analysis. Once a theoretical foundation has been laid, a discussion on the historic role of Navy CAS in support of joint and combined operations since WWII will be presented. This will be followed by a presentation of current arguments against fixed wing CAS and Naval Aviation in general, both from the aspects of fleet vulnerability and excessive costs. These broad based arguments against carrier air in general must be addressed, since it must be deduced that if one believes aircraft carriers themselves are obsolete, then any pursuant arguments concerning Navy CAS in specific are irrelevant. With this foundation established, an analysis of Navy CAS in particular will be presented. Finally, conclusions concerning Army/Navy CAS cooperation will be presented. In the end it is proposed that Army weaknesses are Navy strengths, and that Army strengths are Navy weaknesses. Planners must learn to recognize these capabilities across service boundaries, or future endeavors are bound to fail. Joint training in the area of CAS is vital to our success in future operations, as synergistic effects must negate individual service weaknesses. Training and a willingness to move forward conceptually in the tactical application of CAS must remain our focus as we move CAS into the 21st century.

ADA 340174 Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)