The transformation of the Army from its current "legacy" structure to the Objective Force is predicated on the realization of significant technological advances and the evolution of a "general-purpose" combat force. Today's forces, "Legacy Forces" in the transformation lexicon, are highly dependent upon specially trained and equipped cavalry organizations. Currently, cavalry units provide robust capabilities for reconnaissance, surveillance and security along with ground combat capabilities commanders may use in economy of force roles. Simultaneously, the transformation of armored cavalry units to Interim Force Reconnaissance, Surveillance and Target Acquisition (RSTA) organizations will significantly diminish the organization's capability to independently execute the traditional cavalry tasks requiring contact with an enemy force. The current transformation plan culminates with fielding of the Objective Force Unit of Action and the likely elimination of specialized cavalry forces. Reconnaissance and surveillance tasks are assumed by ISR-suite equipped platforms while force-oriented tasks are executed by Future Combat System (FCS) equipped general-purpose units. As the transformation progresses through the Interim Force and eventually to the Objective Force, the current doctrinal and organizational foundation of cavalry diminishes then disappears. The consequences of military failure in future conflict are obviously dangerous and potentially catastrophic. According to Cohen and Gooch, failure to learn is one of the most common types of military failure. The analysis of the critical assumptions related to the future of cavalry highlights the current transformation's possible failure due to an overreliance on technology. The RSTA squadron of the Interim Force has been organized to operate using the expected, but not yet available, technologies capable of meeting the traditional cavalry roles in the Objective Force. In the case of the United States Army's transformation and its decisions involving the future of cavalry a learning failure is becoming evident. The concepts for the Objective Force and the organization of its interim cavalry force seem to ignore the historical lessons learned on the limitations of technology in combat. Another potentially critical failure is a failure to anticipate. This assumption that the US will maintain technological superiority over all potential adversaries is also reflected in the organization of Interim Force Cavalry units or RSTA squadrons. A potentially more catastrophic type of military failure is the failure to adapt. The potential for a failure of adaptation increases. Beyond the purely tactical potential for adaptation failure is the potential for force wide failure from lack of training and experience. Although military failure for the Objective Force is not a foregone conclusion, the potential for one or more types of failure is present. The current Objective Force Concept and Transformation Campaign Plan display opportunities for military failure in all three domains. Ensuring that the interim cavalry force is able to conduct the full array of traditional cavalry roles requires increasing the organic firepower resident in the RSTA squadron's ground troops.

ADA 403762 Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)