This study examines four potential courses of action for transforming the Combat Training Centers (CTCs) to provide adequate training for the Objective Force. The Combat Training Centers examined in this study (the National Training Center at Fort Irwin California; the Joint Readiness Training Center at Fort Polk, Louisiana; and the Combat Maneuver Training Center in Germany) represent the Army's premiere training facilities for live battlefield simulations at the battalion and brigade levels, and may require significant changes to serve the Objective Force with the same level of training which the Legacy Force has enjoyed over the past two decades. The study evaluates each of four courses of action using three primary criteria derived from the Army Transformation Campaign Plan and associated subordinate Army documents. The courses of action examined include broadening the training centers' mission set to incorporate stability and support operations, expanding the training centers' charter to include the execution of company and platoon lane training, the incorporation of the training centers into a larger joint training facility, and the more radical idea of modifying the training centers to focus on expeditionary operations. The study evaluates each of these courses of action in terms of the degree to which each trains the Objective Force in rapid deployment, rapid transitions between types of operations, the employment of ad hoc organizations, and operations against an adaptive opponent. The evaluation resulted in five major findings, presented as recommendations in the conclusion of the paper, to include: 1) the CTCs should modify their training method to focus on the rapid deployment of the training unit directly to the training environment; 2) CTC rotations should take place as part of a larger joint exercise, even if the rest of the exercise involves only virtual or constructive simulations; 3) units should rotate to a CTC just prior to assuming a deployable status, following a period of progressive training; 4) CTC rotations should fully integrate stability and support operations into each rotation; 5) CTCs should be flexible enough to rapidly modify their Opposing Force to replicate emerging threats in anticipated contingencies. The study further concludes that, while some steps in the right direction are already underway, much remains to be done before the Objective Force arrives.

ADA416916 Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)