This study analyzes the adequacy of current United States Army battlefield reconstitution doctrine in light of changes in Army warfighting doctrine. The study proposes that a smaller Army, operating primarily from bases located in the continental United States, will conduct reconstitution differently than the way the Army conducted reconstitution under its previous warfighting doctrine. The analysis includes an explanation of the close relationship between changes in the strategic environment, changes in warfighting doctrine, and changes in reconstitution doctrine. The analysis also includes a historical review of Army warfighting and reconstitution doctrine since World War II, and provides specific historical examples of the reconstitution of Army combat forces in the context of existing doctrine. The analysis concludes that short notice contingency operations into an immature theater will likely create a nearly imperceptible blend between the operational and tactical levels of war. Reconstitution in such operations may need to take advantage of strategic and operational lift capabilities to provide whole or sub-unit packages of combat forces into the theater to replace combat ineffective units. The potential rapid tempo of joint, combined, and interagency power projection operations in the 1990s will reduce the feasibility of conducting detailed regeneration as proposed under current reconstitution doctrine. The Study concludes that current Army reconstitution doctrine inadequately addresses the requirements of a force projection Army.

ADA 272977 Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)