This study examines the current Army, Air Force, and joint doctrines' impact on the Army's aim of simultaneous attack of an enemy in depth. The research shows that no joint planning or execution occurs between the Land and Air Component Commanders. This results in the development and execution of separate land and air operations without achieving the desired effects of synchronized operations and inhibits the Army from attacking enemy forces simultaneously throughout their depth. Analysis of the current doctrine included an examination of US air and land synchronization doctrine used in World War II. This examination identifies the functions executed by the land and air components in World War II that led to successful operational level land and air force synchronization. Using the determined criteria, this study evaluates the current joint doctrine's ability to synchronize land and air component operations and achieve the Army's goal of simultaneously attacking enemy forces throughout their depth. The current doctrine contains a major weakness. It requires the land component commander to synchronize all effects of weapon systems within his assigned AO without providing the tools necessary to effect that synchronization. Specifically, the land component commander is able only to nominate for attack, air interdiction targets within his AO to the air component commander. Effective synchronization within the land component commander's AO demands that he have the authority to determine the timing, priority, and effects of air delivered interdiction.

ADA 300254 Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)