Operation Desert Storm was fought with an immature counter-TBM weapons system, without joint or service AMD doctrine, and without the benefit of joint training. Twelve years later Army AMD forces took to the battlefield once again as part of a joint and coalition force, this time exercising within a JTAMD architecture, possessing a significantly enhanced PAC-3 missile capability, utilizing an evolving doctrine and benefiting from limited joint training. Despite the successful engagements of nine of nine inbound TBM missiles, there were two fratricide aircraft engagements, and one Air Force engagement of a US Patriot unit. Successful execution of an Early Warning net, the establishment of the Tactical Information Datalink (TADIL), and the successful integration of coalition forces, specifically Kuwaiti forces, into the JTAMD architecture were largely the result of intensive training exercises, and the implementation of a combined Operational Readiness Evaluation (ORE) team specific to that region, and focused on the specific threat associated with Iraq and its WMD capability. The purpose of this paper was to investigate the "success" of Army AMD as part of a JTAMD system in order to determine to what degree "jointness" was successful, and whether this success was the result of a focused effort, specific to this region, or truly representative of a joint approach to develop a Joint TAMD capability. An assessment of the Army AMD as an element of the JTAMD served to reveal issues specific to a service component as it related to the joint system and further necessitated an appreciation for the interaction of numerous variables within a complex environment. Dietrich Doerner's model for understanding complex systems served as useful framework in assessing the Army AMD system. My conclusion is that "jointness" remains little understood I have also concluded that primacy of technological research and development efforts during the 12 years between Operation Desert Storm and OIF resulted in a disjointed effort to field technological improvements, train soldier proficiency on new systems' capabilities, train successfully as a part of a JTAMD architecture, and meet the demands of increasingly demanding world-wide Patriot missions. Additionally, I have concluded that the absence of a centralized training and evaluation process within the Army AMD itself or the JTAMD in general, combined with a bifurcated organizational structures at Ft Bliss contributed to a gradual degradation of training proficiency and subordination of training itself as a resource priority. This was reflected in wide disparities in crew proficiency and an inability to resolve the decade old problem of airspace management. The effort to achieve "jointness" is further impeded due to the lack of a joint forcing function and the contradicting demands for "seamless interdependence" within a system that resources funding along service lines. My conclusions resulted in three recommendations for the Army AMD community. First, a new model is necessary that defines training mastery and leadership development as resource priorities over technological development. This model must also emphasize management of change, and the development of adaptive learning processes as part of a robust, centralized training framework. At the same time, a centralized organization is needed, which, comprised of masters of JTAMD and tasked with validating core competency standards, is entrusted with managing the tactical readiness of the branch as a whole. In lieu of a structured joint training architecture similar to the NATO model, this organization will serve admirably in ensuring crew proficiency in depth and breadth, across the branch. Finally, consideration needs to be given to eliminating the bifurcated organizational structures and relationships at Ft Bliss in order to facilitate a unified effort in addressing JTAMD shortcomings, and in the development joint capabilities.

ADA436370 Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)