This paper will examine three broad topics. First, it will reconsider the notion of 'doctrine'. Doctrine provides a link between certain 'objective' military realities - in this case the existence of nuclear weapons with particular characteristics - and a political system which inevitably relects 'subjective' values and uncertainties. One should expect to find some relationship between the nature of a political system and the way in which it understands and manages nuclear competition. Second, the paper will consider the problem of security in the nuclear age and how it is reflected in doctrine. It will argue that security is a relative concept that is best understood in terms of a continuum between minimum and maximum levels, rather than in terms of an absolute choice between security through deterrence and security through war-fighting. The paper will argue that, while Soviet leaders do understand and value deterrence as a 'minimum' guarantee of their security, they seek to go beyond this minimum level and to maximize Soviet security by the acquisition of war-fighting capabilities. Third and finally, the paper will analyse certain basic features of the Soviet system which may motivate the apparent drive to maximize Soviet security through the pursuit of war-fighing capabilites.

Cover title. Adelphi Paper 210. PDF is available via the Library's subscription to Infomaworld: www.informaworld.com "Summer 1986."

Introduction--I. Doctrine--II. Security--III. The Soviet System--IV. Conclusion.