Major Richard Coyle served as commander of the Headquarters and Headquarters Troop, 4th Squadron, 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment throughout Iraq from April 2003 through July 2004 in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom. Coyle's deployment to Iraq was unusual in that his squadron was in the process of redeploying back to the United States in April 2004 when the so-called Mahdi uprising occurred and the unit was ordered to turn around and spend three more months there. One major challenge he had to deal with were the big deficiencies in his troop with respect to convoy operations and force protection, and overcoming mindset of a linear battlefield. He was not able to conduct all the weapons training he wanted before deploying, saying that every soldier needs to able to fire the M16, the Mk-19, the .50 cal machine gun and the nine millimeter pistol. He notes that once the insurgency developed, they started supporting large cordon and search operations around Baghdad, focusing on countering the improvised explosive devices and mortar threats. Coyle mentions the level of support and how it improved over the length of their deployment, singling out tires, food and air conditioning as his three biggest areas of concern. He relates how, after moving to Al Kut in April 2004, the squadron was co-located with a variety of coalition forces, including a Polish aviation squadron, a Ukrainian infantry brigade, an explosive ordnance disposal team from Kazakhstan, and a Romanian unmanned aerial vehicle detachment. He recalls that, at Al Kut, the Polish provided the Catholic services, and so the Mass was half in English and half in Polish. Coyle says that his most difficult challenge as a troop commander was keeping the soldiers focused on becoming better soldiers every day of a very long deployment. The most important lessons he learned from this deployment was that an aviation squadron has to balance the capability to surge its helicopters with the ability to maintain a reserve, and that the aircrew on the spot will have to deal with whatever situation they find and should all be trained to adequately do so. Coyle closes his interview by stating that the Army should devote 90 percent of its training time to low-intensity, counterinsurgency operations because that is the current fight, but as the current fight fades, high-intensity operations should be reemphasized.

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