This study examines the issue of fighting with operational fires at the theater level. Specifically, it examines the question how can the JFC best integrate airspace control measures, fire support coordination measures, and ADA control measures to fight with operational fires. Two major events have affected the way in which the JFC can look at conducting his campaign plan. The first is the 1986Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act. The second is recent technological developments which changed the dynamics on the battlefield. The Goldwater-Nichols Act shifted the military's focus on joint warfighting and interoperability. This change placed the responsibility for the development of joint doctrine on the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It also placed more autonomy in the theater commanders-in-chief. Recent technological developments have enabled the branches of the service to more accurately engage enemy targets at ranges greater than ever before. This capability was first manifested during the Persian Gulf War. The use of ATACMS, Patriot, and cruise missiles changed the role of the JFC from a battlefield manager to an active warfighter. At the foundation of this examination is the interaction between doctrine, technology and organizational structure at the theater level. Each of the services provides different capabilities to the JFC. Currently the doctrine and organizational structure do not support technological capabilities. The Army's TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5 provides a conceptual framework for how to think about the elements required for success in future conflicts. Central to the concept are five battlefield dynamics. The dynamic that directly applies to the JFC in this study is depth and simultaneous attack. In accordance with the Goldwater-Nichols Act, future conflicts will require an organizational structure and doctrine that effectively and efficiently synchronize service capabilities at the theater level. Currently, the organizational structure and doctrine do not support the JFC as a warfighter. This study offers a solution to the doctrinal and organizational deficiency. The monograph consists of five chapters. Chapter one frames the problem. Chapter two examines the current service and special operations forces capabilities, doctrine and organizational control measures. Chapter three discusses the role of future warfighting trends in fighting with operational fires. Chapter four examines joint doctrine and organization structure. It offers a solution to the integration of FSCMs with airspace command and control measures, and air defense control measures under a joint organizational structure. This solution allows the theater commander to maximize his deep fires capabilities. Lastly, chapter five addresses the conclusions of the study.

ADA 314859 Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)