This report addresses the viability of the concept of creating massive terrain obstacles, and whether our doctrine adequately supports the concept. It is written from the perspective of a maneuver planner focusing on mid and high-intensity conflicts, and seeks ways to offset the numerical inferiority our forces may well face in such situations. The author first examines the theoretical foundations for the military use of terrain. Then two historical examples of the creation and exploitation of large terrain obstacles are presented to assess the feasibility and effectiveness of the concept. This is followed by a look at current Army countermobility doctrine and an analysis of its adequacy in supporting this concept. The author concludes that the concept is valid and useful in the context of AirLand Battle, but that current doctrine, while possessing the foundational parts to support the concept, is not sufficiently integrated and developed for the concept to be used to its fullest potential.

ADA 225488 Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)