Major Richard Hetherington served as a liaison officer (LNO) between the Combined Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC), the Kuwaiti Ministry of Defense (MoD), and the American Embassy in Kuwait from August 2002 through August 2003 in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom. Hetherington starts the interview by saying that he had missed out on participating in Operation Desert Storm, so when he learned of the opportunity to deploy to Iraq, he volunteered. Upon arrival in Camp Doha, Kuwait, it was quickly found out that he had previously been a Pentagon briefer to the Chief of Staff of the Army and the Secretary of the Army, and so it was determined that his experience best suited him as a liaison officer at the highest level. He notes how he spent many hours creating or modifying PowerPoint slides and that this skill was the foundation of all his other duties. He quickly found out that he had to interact with not only the military at the embassy, but also representatives of the Defense Intelligence Agency and the CIA. Establishing and maintaining personal relationships became extremely important in dealing with his counterparts in the Kuwaiti military, and he found it awkward at times not having any knowledge of Arabic. The quality of his work reflected on his Kuwaiti counterparts as they would receive it, then turn around and brief it to their superiors, making them appear competent or not depending on its quality. This dynamic also worked against information sharing across the Kuwaiti services because credit had to be taken for various pieces of intelligence at the highest levels before it flowed across service organizations. He found himself answering to three separate superiors: the intelligence officer of CFLCC, the LNO at the embassy, and the LNO at the Kuwaiti MoD. He also found the ambassador, Richard Jones, to have an outstanding knowledge of the US military and to be a constant source of insightful questions. During combat operations, he observed commanders and staff officers staying up three and four days straight, becoming exhausted, making questionable decisions, and making themselves ineffective for failing to establish a good battle rhythm. He closes his interview by stating that there is great value in having an intelligence officer with combat maneuver experience; that family separation is tough but would not stop him from deploying again; that the Army needs to find some way to keep its senior officers tactically proficient; and that his assignment in Kuwait was very rewarding professionally.

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