The goal of this monograph is to investigate how the operational level of war applies to military operations short of war. The paper begins with a review of the theoretical linkages between military operations and political aims. Next, the author examines how law and joint doctrine define the role of America's designated operational commanders, the Commanders in Chief of the unified combatant commands, in combat and operations short of war. The bulk of the paper is a survey of several operations short of war from the Cuban missile crisis of 1962 through Operation Golden Pheasant in 1988. These operations will be examined from the perspective of how military operations were developed and executed to support strategic aims. The author concludes that the sensitivity of operations short of war and the availability of modern communications have created conditions under which the operational level of command in operations short of war is exercised by the National Command Authority and the Joint Chiefs of Staff rather than by the combatant Commanders in Chief. While this close control over field operations has its potential pitfalls, it does serve to insure a strong linkage between strategic aims and military operations.

ADA 254134 Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)