This monograph discusses how division commanders might better train their staffs to be versatile. Since all Army divisions, in effect, are contingency units in the post Cold War security environment, versatility is imperative. Division commanders will need versatile staffs to enable the unit to produce sound plans for deployment to and operations in unfamiliar environments on short notice. This monograph examines how the staff is affected by the requirement to produce quality plans and estimates under conditions of uncertainty, and how division commanders can train versatile staffs. The monograph first outlines the changes in the US security environment which have made versatility an imperative, and demonstrates the value of a versatile staff to the division as a whole. Next, it shows that the commander can not be confident that his staff is versatile unless he has assessed their versatility in training or operations; it is not sufficient to assess the staff against the "worst-case" threat. It first shows this by historical examples - Napoleon after 1809; US Army forces defending against the Chinese attack in Korea in December, 1950; and US Army forces' MOUT operations in JUST CAUSE - of staffs which were well trained, yet lacked versatility. It then examines reasons why otherwise well trained staffs might not be versatile. The monograph demonstrates both theoretically and by practical examples that it is feasible to train staffs to be versatile. Finally, the monograph outlines a process for staff versatility training based on the training management doctrine from Field Manual 25-100, Training the Force. It concludes that staff versatility training requires the commander to assess versatility by examining his staff's capabilities in varying scenarios and missions, and that training for versatility requires: establishing very broad doctrinal knowledge, teaching the staff to gather and learn new information under time pressure, and training the staff to perform quick, bias-free analysis. It further concludes that the staff is best trained for versatility when they are forced to perform under time pressure, facing new scenarios and missions rather than being forced to analyze one "worst-case" scenario in great depth.

ADA 293632 Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)