In August 2010, the U.S. Army published The United States Army Operating Concept 2016-2028 (AOC). The AOC attempts to forecast the Army's future capability requirements based on analysis of possible threats. In past and current deployments, the U.S. Army has sought to achieve versatility with a standardized force structure of light, medium, and heavy forces optimized for major combat operations. In the event of a different type of conflict, Army leaders changed their units' training focus and requested additional resources to make up any capability gaps. This approach to versatility requires time, expertise, and equipment to conduct the relatively rapid transformation. Due to a variety of potential future threats, the requirement to react quickly to emerging threats, and constrained financial resources, the U.S. Army must create a single, versatile, and agile force structure that can adapt to uncertain and unexpected conditions. How should the United States Army optimize its brigade combat teams (BCTs) for versatility and agility to meet the requirements anticipated through 2028 in the recently published AOC? The research answers this question by examining future requirements for BCTs and their current ability to meet these requirements in order to determine capability gaps, which provides the basis for recommendations. The most likely level of conflict facing future BCTs remains in the insurgency level of the conflict spectrum. However, this assessment also recognizes the requirement to prepare the U.S. Army to counter violent extremism and indirect attacks from emerging regional powers employing a hybrid strategy during the next two decades. The 2008 National Defense Strategy provides the baseline for determining the priority of missions. Consequently, the U.S. Army's future BCTs must prepare for two types of future; insurgency and general war. The U.S. Army's solutions for future tactical missions in either type of conflict are contained in the AOC. The AOC solutions use two different but mutually supporting operational concepts: CAM and WAS. Advancements in technology served as the driving forces behind transformation in the U.S. Army since the Vietnam War. The success of these changes in actual combat performance varies. In recent experience, technology focused changes failed to deliver on their promises in an IW environment. Countering the most likely and most dangerous future threats requires changes to the BCT organizational structures and training. The range of options available for future planners includes building two different threat-based force structures - one specialized for MCO and the other specialize for COIN, or, developing one broad capabilities-base force that can perform equally well in both operational themes. The U.S. Army must anticipate the possibility of reduced funding and establish clear spending priorities to guide associated resourcing decisions. Any potential solutions to optimizing BCTs for CAM and WAS missions must consider the future impacts of reduced funding. The most effective innovations for COIN operations in the past decade emerged not from technological advances, but from simple solutions like increasing the availability of armored wheeled vehicles. In order to give BCTs flexibility, the Department of the Army should redesign all BCTs with two MTOE force structures that provide flexibility to conduct both the combined arms maneuver and wide area security missions. BCTs require training based on a multiple-mission METL that includes CAM and WAS. Additionally, in order to maintain MCO-proficiency for specialty or support units in the BCTs, such as field artillery or engineers, garrison commands for these units must assist or augment the BCT staffs to improve their capability to plan and evaluate training for these units.

ADA 548897 Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.