Korean Showdown: National Policy and Military Strategy in a Limited War, 1951–1952 takes a holistic and integrative approach to strategy, operations, and tactics during the Korean War’s stalemate period and demonstrates how these matters shaped each other and influenced, or were influenced by, political and strategic policy decision-making. Bryan R. Gibby offers an analysis of the major political and military decisions affecting how the war was conducted operationally and diplomatically by examining American, Chinese, North Korean, and South Korean operations in the context of fighting a limited war with limited means, but for objectives that were not always limited in scope or ambition. The foundational political decision was Harry Truman’s voluntary repatriation policy, which extended the war by up to eighteen months. Its military counterpart was the American-led Operation Showdown, the last deliberate military offensive to coerce concessions at the negotiation table. Showdown’s failure (and the Communists’ own equally disappointing military efforts) opened up new avenues for solving the war short of a militarily imposed solution.

The limited war problem --The Korean War, June 1950-June 1951 -- The new war, July-October 1951 -- The war in the air -- The communist armies reform, summer 1951-spring 1952 -- Reopening the negotiations : settling the demarcation line and active defense -- Truman decides on the POWs -- A strategy of persistence : the CPVF's adaptation to modern war -- "A Situation beyond Repair," May-August 1952 -- The summer campaign -- White horse mountain, September-October 1952 -- Operation Showdown, October-November 1952 -- Settling for a settlement, November-December 1952.