The cognitive demands on commanders are increasing. Due to the speed of innovation and change, commanders' ability to make good risk decisions are challenged. Future warfare is unlikely to resemble previous conflicts or training exercises that focus on a conventional fight. US adversaries avoid using set doctrine in order to present unforeseen hazards which are difficult to anticipate or mitigate. Given that a commander must not merely avoid risk, but accept it to gain and maintain the initiative in war, commanders and their staffs should consider whether the Army's risk doctrine and the doctrinal risk gradient method at the center of Army risk management are sufficient for future warfare as described in the concept of multi-domain operations. From the study of cognition, the concept of "risk perception" offers insight into how risk management personnel (usually the staff or subject matter experts) and risk decision-makers (often commanders) can evaluate risk analysis methods. Risk perception, the subjective judgement of risk levels, is an idea in stark contrast to the idea that presenting facts and data is necessarily convincing. Risk perception studies have demonstrated the importance of context, narrative, and simplicity in the communication of risk. In the risk decision-maker, unfamiliarity, innumeracy, and deeply held biases or fears can result in a perceived level of risk far from that of experts. Three additional methods of risk analysis are compared to the Army doctrinal risk gradient. Derived from civilian methods, these tools are used in project management, engineering, and other risk and foresight related fields. They are fault trees, scenarios, and risk triplets. Although they all have some quantitative elements, they offer just as much if not more room for risk management personnel to apply critical thinking and share context such as uncertainty in forecasting or linkages to the planned operation. As described in Army publications and articles, future warfare is expected to require commanders to master five domains - including the unfamiliar cyber and space domains - in areas of operation that tend to be vaster than previous, in operations trending toward increased speed of maneuver and innovation. In such an environment, whether in competition, conflict, counter-insurgency, or large-scale ground combat, all military professionals should use the best possible risk analysis to preserve lives and achieve objectives. To that end, this paper recommends possible changes to doctrine, leader development, and staff operations.

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