In 1990, in response to the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq, the Army mobilized nearly 150, 000 Army Reserve (USAR) and Army National Guard (ARNG) soldiers. The overall success of the mobilization, especially the success of the Combat Service and Combat Service Support units, and the overwhelming victory in DESERT SHIELD/STORM has resulted in a failure to fully appreciate why and how the mobilization worked. As a result, future military strategy of the US is being at least partially based on principles that require a quick response projected from the Continental US by rapidly deploying significant forces (to include significant Reserve forces) on short notice. Unfortunately, changes that have taken place since the conclusion of DESERT STORM raise doubts about the assumption that the Army can mobilize the force as it did during DESERT SHIELD. Such changes include the virtual elimination of the Continental Army Area Personnel and Logistics staffs, the activation of the US Army Reserve Command, the closure of numerous bases and installations, and substantial structure cuts. This study examines the reasons that mobilization during DESERT SHIELD/STORM was successful and why such a mobilization in the future may be impossible to replicate. It focuses on the Army Reserve and does not include the Army National Guard, although many of the lessons learned during DESERT SHIELD/STORM may apply to both the Reserve and Guard. The study concludes by making recommendations that, if enacted, will improve the Army's ability to rapidly and effectively mobilize Reserve forces in the future.

DTIC report: AD-A264 490.