This monograph examines how and why Soviet tactical artillery dominance threatens victory on the AirLand Battlefield. Soviet tactical/operational doctrine, as delineated in the 1987 version of Taktika, is offensively oriented, stresses combined arms, and places a premium on the role of artillery within that doctrinal framework. Soviet artillery force structure and fire support doctrine are clearly consistent with this theme. The U.S. tactical commander must not only understand the unique aspects of Soviet warfighting, but recognize the specific threat posed by each arm and how it contributes to the synergism of combined arms warfare. Soviet artillery is quantitatively and qualitatively superior. U.S. artillery is incapable of winning the counterfire fight strictly through an "artillery duel." The focus of this monograph is to identify weaknesses in the Soviet fire support system that can be exploited with U.S. tactical strengths. Through this methodology, possible methods, techniques and procedures for winning the counterfire fight can be discerned. This requires the tactical commander to be innovative and skillful in applying AirLand Battle doctrine to synchronize all his assets - organic and supporting - deep, close and rear. Current U.S. tactical doctrine is vague at best in addressing the magnitude of the problem. The counterfire dilemma demands that we solve it with a multi-functional solution. Relying solely on one branch - Field Artillery - for this mission imposes too great of a degree of risk; it is one risk the tactical commander may not be able to accept.

ADA 226009 Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)