This monograph discusses how the U.S. Army can successfully use light armor in deep operational maneuver at the corps level. Recent operations in the Persian Gulf during Operation Desert Storm emphasized the need for deep operations. New light armored vehicles, the creation of additional light armored units, existing regional armored threats, and the doctrinal need for high speed armored forces with deep operational capability will force the U.S. Army to examine how to successfully use light armor in deep operations. The study focuses on three areas: (1) how to organize light armored forces for deep operations, (2) the objectives of light armored forces in deep operations, and (3) the forms of maneuver used by light armored forces in deep operations. This monograph first examines the theoretical use of light armor in deep operational maneuver. The theory section discusses the works of J.F.C. Fuller, M.N. Tukhachevsky, V.K. Triandafillov, G.S. Isserson, and Heinz Guderian. Next, the study examines three historical examples of light armor in deep operational maneuver. The three operations are the Kiev Operation (1920), the Khalkhin Gol campaign (1939), and Operation Bagration (1944). The study then analyzes the theoretical and historical use of light armor in deep operational maneuver. This monograph reaches three conclusions. First, the light armored force organization for deep operational maneuver should be a combined arms force similar to the Soviet cavalry mechanized group (CMG). The light armor based CMG could serve as a model for the U.S. Army's mobile strike force (MSF) concept. The composition of the MSF would consist of a light armored cavalry regiment, two light armored brigades, an aviation brigade, and a combat support brigade. Second, a light armored MSF would be effective against deep operational objectives. The light armored MSF would be extremely effective against the enemy command and control structure, lines of comnunication, logistics assets, artillery, and operational reserves. Light armored forces would also have the ability to seize key terrain. Lastly, a light armored MSF can conduct envelopments, turning movements, infiltrations, and limited penetrations. Light armor can not conduct frontal attacks or penetrations against a coherent defense.

ADA 284507 Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)