History shows that the U.S. Army can fight and defeat its opponents using centralized command concepts, but the challenges of the contemporary operating environment place a premium on the abilities of subordinate commanders to act independently and more quickly than their opponents act. Spurred by the 2002 National Security Strategy (NSS) call for "transform[ing] ...to meet the challenges and opportunities of the twenty-first century", the Army's leadership elected to concentrate the service's transformation efforts on battle command. The three pillars supporting the U.S. Army's transformation of battle command are its doctrine of mission command, reorganization of its warfighting forces - including the creation of the Unit of EmploymentX (UEX) headquarters - and the emerging joint concept of network centric warfare (NCW). Mission command provides a foundation for freedom of action, network centric warfare provides a framework for rapid decision-making, and the UEX headquarters and its modular brigade combat teams provide commanders with the organizational structure and resources to translate accelerated, low-level decision making into action. The decision to merge these practices and concepts, coupled with the focus on transformation through battle command, necessitates understanding how network centric warfare may affect the UEX's use of mission command doctrine. FM 6-0, Mission Command: Command and Control of Army Forces, states that trust and mutual understanding underpin the practice of mission command. Evaluated against these two principles, the Army's move to a brigade-based force, coupled with policy changes and emerging warfighting concepts, improves UEX commanders' ability to exercise mission command. These improvements overshadow the tendency of commanders to diminish trust and mutual understanding by relying on centralized command and control practices, which result from the influence of U.S. Army policies, UEX structural and conceptual limitations, and features of network centric warfare theory. Therefore, to retain the advantages of mission command, UEX Commanders must remain aware of the impediments to mission command, which can come from U.S. Army culture and policies, UEX structure and employment concepts, and the concept of network centric warfare. To foster awareness of the impediments to practicing mission command, the U.S. Army should take several initiatives to refine the UEX structure and, more broadly, the U.S. Army culture. These initiatives strengthen social networks, which in turn aids in cultivating and preserving trust. Additionally, the Army should improve mutual understanding through training, material solutions, leadership development, or personnel policy.

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