The FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia) reached its highest point in military capabilities by 1998. In 2002, this insurgent group was a threat to the Colombian political system. The government of Alvaro Uribe designed and implemented the Democratic Security and Defense Policy (DSDP). After eight years of application, the DSDP was successful in reducing the FARC political and military capabilities to a point where today, the FARC is still a threat to the country's security, but its chances of changing the political system has disappeared. Two aspects made the policy successful: first, the design of the DSDP, which adapted different Counterinsurgency (COIN) principles to the Colombian environment; and second, the implementation of the DSDP, which includes the unique leadership style of Uribe, the creation of an interagency organization, the development of special operations capabilities, the periodic publicity of statistics and achievements, and the long-term application. The policy had some downsides as well; which when analyzed with the above factors valuable lessons are offered which can contribute to improving the ongoing COIN strategy in Colombia. Furthermore, it can serve as a base model for implementation in other regions of the world.

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